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A MODEL OF GROWTH THROUGH CREATIVE DESTRUCTION
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Thispaper develops a model based on Schumpeter's process of creative
destruction. It departs from existing models of endogeneous growth in emphasizing
obsolescenceof old technologies induced by the accumulation of knowledge and the
resulting process or industrial innovations. This has both positive and normative
implications for growth. In positive terms, the prospect of a high level of research in the
future can deter research today by threatening the fruits of that research with rapid
obsolescence. In normative terms, obsolescence creates a negative externality from
innovations, and hence a tendency for laissez-faire economies to generate too many
innovations, i.e too much growth. This "business-stealing" effect is partly compensated
by the fact that innovations tend to be too small under laissez-faire.
The model possesses a unique balanced growth equilibrium in which the log of
GNP follows a random walk with drift. The size of the drift is the average growth rate
of the economy and it is endogeneous to the model ; in particular it depends on the size
and likilihood of innovations resulting from research and also on the degree of market
power available to an innovator.
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Canada1. INTRODLJCION
This paper presents a model of endogenous stochastic growth, based on Schuxnpecers
idea of creative desiruction. We begin from the belief, supported by many empirical studies
starting with Solow (1957), that a large proportion of economic growth in developed counthes
is atthbutable to improvement in technology rather than the accumulation of capital. The
paper models technological progress as occurring in the form of innovations, which in turn
result from the activities of research firms.
We depart from existing models of endogenous growth (Rorner, 1986, 1988; and Lucas,
1988) in two fundamental respects. First, we emphasize the fact that technological progress
creates losses as well as gains, by rendering obsolete old sidils, goods, markets, and
manufacturing processes. This has both positive and normative implications for growth. In
positive terms, the prospect of a high level of research in the future can deter research today
by threatening the fruits of that research with rapid obsolescence. In normative terms,
obsolescence creates a negative externality from innovations, and hence a tendency for
laissez—faire to generate too much growth.
Obsolescence does not fit well into existing models of endogenous growth. Those
models have only positive externalities, in the form of technology spillovers, and thus tend to
generate too little growth. The closest in spirit to our model is that of Romer (1988). In that
model innovations consist of the invention of new intermediate goods, neither better nor worse
than existing ones. Once invented a good remains in production forever. Growth takes place
because of the lengthening of the list of available intermediate goods. This model does a good
job of capturing the division—of--labor aspect of growth. But adding obsolescence, by
allowing old goods to be displaced by the inuoduction of new goods, may eliminate growth in
this nd of model (see Deneckere and Judd, 19861).
Our second departure is that we view the growth process as discontinuous. We share
the view taken by many economic historians that individual technological breakthroughs have
aggregate effects, that the uncertainty of innovations does not average out across indusuies.
1This view is supported by recent empirical evidence of authors such as Nelson and Plosser
(1982) and Campbell and Manltiw (1987) that the uend component of an economy's GNP
includes a substantial random element.2
Existing models of endogenous growth do not produce a random end, unless
exogenous technology shocks are added to the model, as is done by King and Rebelo (1988).
We take the view that technology shocks should not be regarded as exogenous in an analysis
that seeks to explain the economic decisions underlying the accumulation of knowledge.
Instead, we suppose that they are entirely the result of such decisions. Statistical innovations
in GNP are produced by economic innovations, the distribution of which is determined by the
equilibrium amount of research. This makes the disthbution of technology shocks endogenous
to the model.3
In maldng both of these departures from recent models of endogenous growth we take
our inspiration from Schumpeter (1942, p.83, his emphasis):
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion
comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or
nansportarion, the new marlcets,...(This processj incessantly revolutionizes the
economic smicture within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly
creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact
about capitalism.
In Schumpeter's view, capitalist growth is inherently uncertain. Fundamental
breakthroughs are the essence of the process, and they affect the entire economy. However,
the uncertainty is endogenous to the system, because the probability of a breakthrough depends
upon the level of research, which in turn depends upon the the monopoly rents that constitute
"the prizes offered by capitalist society to the successful innovator." (1942, p.102) Thus,
"economic life itself changes its own data, by fits and starts." (1934, p.62).
The present paper develops a simple model that articulates these basic Schumpeterian
elements. Although it is quite special in some dimensions we believe it is also simple and
flexible enough to serve as a prototype model of growth through creative destruction.42. THE BASIC MODEL
a. Assumptions
Tnere are four classes of uadeable objects: land, labor, a consumption good, and a
continuum of intermediate goods i e fO,1].Thereis also a continuum of identical
infinitely—lived individuals, with mass N, each endowed with a one—unit flow of labor, and
each with identical intertemporally additive preferences defined over lifetime consumption,
with the constant rate of time preference r> 0. Except in section 5 below, we assume a
constant marginal utility of consumption ar each date; thus r is also the unique rate of interest
in the economy. There is no disutility from supplying labor. There is also a fixed supply H of
land.
The consumption good is produced using land and the intermediate goods, subject to
constant returns. Since H is fixed we can express the production function as:
1
(2.1) y =f(Ftx(i)]/c(i)}di
where F' >0,F" <0, y is the flow output of consumption good, x(i) the flow of intermediate
input 1, and c(i) a parameter indicating, for given factor prices, the unit cost of producing the
consumption good using the intermediate input L
Each intermediate good i is produced using labor alone, accoiding to the linear
technology:
(2.2) x(i)=L(i)
where L(i) is the flow of labor used in intermediate sector i.
Labor has an alternative use to producing intermediate goods. It can also be used in
research, which produces a random sequence of innovations. The Poisson anival rate of
innovations in the economy at any instant is n, where n is the flow of labor used in research
and .aconstant parameter given by the technology of research. There is no memory in this4
technology, since the arrival rare depends only upon the current flow of input to research, not
upon past research.5
Time is continuous, and indexed by t ￿ 0. Tne symbol t =0,1... denotesthe interval
starting with the th innovation (or with =0in the case of t =0)and ending just before the
t+l. The length of each interval is random. If the constant flow of labor n is applied to
research in interval t, its length will be exponentially disnibuted with parameter
Each innovation consists of the invention of a new line of intermediate goods, whose
use as inputs allows more efficient methods to be used in producing consumption goods. We
have in mind such 'input' innovations6 as the steam engine, the airplane, and the computer,
whose use made possible new methods of production in mining, transportation, and banking.
An innovation need, not, however, be as revolutionary as these examples, but might consist
instead of a new generation of intermediate goods, similar to the old ones.
Specifically, use of the new line of intermediate goods reduces the cost parameters c(i)
in (2.1) by the factori E (0,1). We assume away all lags in the diffusion of technology.7 The
most modern intermediate good is always produced in each sector, and the unit—cost parameter
during interval t is the same for all sectors; thus:
(2.3) c(i) =c=c0yV i E [0,1], t =0,1,...,
where c0 is the initial value given by history. (Of course, it is always possible to produce the
consumption good using an old technology, with a correspondingly old line of intermediate
goods.)8
A successful innovator obtains a continuum of patents, one for each intermediate
sector, each one granting the holder the exclusive right to produce the newly invented
intermediate good in that sector. We assume, however, that and—trust laws prohibit anyone
from retaining that right in a positive measure of sectors. So the innovator sells each patent to
a firm that becomes the local monopolist in that sector until the next innovation occurs. (We
assume perfect competition in all markets other than those for the intermediate goods and for
patents.)The innovator offers each patent for sale at a price equal to the expected present value
of the monopoly rents accruing to the patent. The buyer pays that price as a lump sum in
exchange for unconsuained use of the patent. Thus we implicitly rule out royalties and other
conungent connacts between the innovator and the local monopolist. The force of this
resniction will be discussed in (d)belowwhere it is argued that without the resthction the two
parties would want a connact with negative royalties. The resuiction might therefore be
rationalized either by noting that negative royalties are not in fact observed, or by referring to
costs of monitoring the output of the intermediate good.
No patent covers the use of a new intermediate good in the consumption—good sector.
The idea behind this assumption is that potential uses of the new good are too obvious, even
before its invention, to be patented. The assumption might also be rationalized by the
observation that important innovations like the ones mentioned above have had widespread
uses too numerous and diffuse for anyone to monopolize them.
b.The IntermediateMonopolist's Decision Problem
The local monopolist's objective is to maximize the expected present value of the flow
of profits over the cutrent intervaL When the interval ends so do the rents. The only
uncertainty in the decision problem arises because the length of the interval is random.
Because no one operates in a positive measure of sectors the monopolist takes as given the
amount of research at each time, and hence also takes as given the length of the interval.
Because of this and because the cost of the patent is sunk, the monopolist's sategy will be
simply to maximize the flow of operating profits itateach instant.
In equilibrium all prices and quantities are constant throughout the interval. Also, by
symme'y, the same quantity xt will be chosen by each monopolist. This quantity will also be
the total output of intermediate goods in period t,whichby (2.2) equals the total employment
of labor in manufacmring i.e.:6
1 1
x =f x(j) di =f L(i)di to 0
We can then re—express (2.1) as:
F(x)
yt=
The inversedemandcurve facing a monopolist charging the price Pt is the marginal product
schedule:
(2.4) =F'(x)Ic.
Thus thedecision problem is to choose x so as to maximize fF'(x)Ict— w]x,tang c and
w asgiven.The necessary first—order condition is
(2.5) cw =F'(x)+xF"(x).
Assume that the monopolist's marginal—revenue schedule is downward—sloping:
Assumption A.1: 2r(x) +xF"(x) <0 V x >0
This condition holds automatically when F" <0;we show in Appendix I that it also holds
when F comes from a CES production function. It follows from (2.5) and A.1 that there is a
unique solution to the decision problem:
(2.6) =(cw)
where is strictly decreasing. Thus the demand for labor in the intermediate industry is a
decreasing function of the cost (in terms of the consumption good) of producing one efficiency
unit of an intermediate good.






where is sthctly increasing and is sthctly decreasing.
For future use, we also assume:
Assumption A.2: (0) =, (o.) = 0.
We have not allowed the local monopolist's decision problem to be consttuined by
potential competition from the holder of the previous patent. This is because if the consaint
were potentially binding; i.e. if the innovation were non—drastic in the usual sense (see, for
example Tirole, 1988, ch.1O) then the current patent would be of greatest value to the holder
of the previous patent, who would face no such competition. Thus our model predicts that
non—drastic innovations would be implemented by incumbent producers, whereas drastic
innovations would generally be implemented by new firms. This is in accordance with several
empirical studies to the effect that incumbent firms implement less fundamental innovations
than do new ennants. (See, for example, Scherer, 1980.)
Whether or not the innovation is drastic is determined by whether or not a competitive
producer of the consumption good would incur a loss buying from the previous monopolists, at
a price equal to the unit cost w. Thus the condition for a drastic innovation is
C(p,w) >
whereCC) is the unit—cost function uniquely associated with the production function F, and
p is the equilibrium price of land. The latter is detexmined by the conditions for competitive
equilibrium in the markets for land and the consumption good.
C(p,p) =c1
where Pt is the equilibrium market price of all other intermediate goods, given by (2.7).
Thespecial case of a Cobb—Douglas production is defined by:
(2.9) F(x) =x




andinnovations will be drasticifand only if:
(2.13) y<cz.
c. Research
There are no contemporaneous spiliovers in the research sector, that is, a research firm
employing z will experience innovations with a Poisson arrival rate z, and these arrivals will
be independent of other firms research employment i =— z.9Let W be the value of a
research firm after the 1th innovation, and let Vt be the value of patents from the 1th
innovation. If the firm makes an innovation it will receive V÷1. The density of this event at
the current instant is z. Thus the expected payoff per unit time from successful innovation is
zV11. The firm will realize acapital gainon W+i_W1 when any flrmmakesan
innovation. Thus its expected rate of capital gain is Xn 't+1 —W1).Its flow of labor cost is
wZ. It takes w andas given. Thus we have the Bellman equation:10
(2.14) rW1 =(z￿O}
t+1+ t + )(W11 —
W1)
—wz





The Kuhn-Tucker condition is:
(2.16) w ￿ z ￿ 0, with at least one equality (waloe).
The value V1 is the expected present value of the constant flowover an interval
whose length is exponentially disthbuted with parameter Xn1:
(2.17) Vt =r9
Note that there is an important intertemporal spillover in this model. An innovation
reduces costs forever. It allows each subsequent innovation to reduce the unit—cost parameter
c by the same fraction 7, and with the same probability but from a starting value c_1
that will be lower by the fraction '(than t would otherwise have been. The producer of an
innovation will capture (some of) the rents from that cost reduction, but only during the next
interval. After that the rents will be captured by other innovators, building upon the basis of
the present innovation, but without compensating the present innovator.11 This interremporal
spillover will play a role in the welfare analysis of section 4 below.
The model thus embodies Schumpeter's idea of "creative desmiction". Each innovation
is an act of eation aimed at capturing monopoly rents. But it also dcsnoys the monopoly
rents that motivated the previous creation. Creative desmiction accounts for the term Xn in
the denominator of Vt in (2.17). More research this period will reduce the expected tenure of
the current monopolists, and hence reduce the expected present value of their flow of rents.12
d. Wage Determination
Becanse n is aggregate research employment, (2.16) implies:
(2.18) w ￿ XV1, ￿ 0, waloe.
Combining (2.8), (2.17), (2.18) and the equilibrium condition:
(2.19) x+n=N; t=0,1
yields the condition:
Xx (c 1w 1)/c
(2.20) w ￿ t+1= t+t+ ,x ￿ N; waloe. tr + n+i (rA) + N -x(c+iw+i)
Condition (2.20) describes the supply of labor to the intermediate sector. It says that
unless that sector absorbs all the economy's labor, the wage will equal labor's opportunity Cost
in research, This condition, together with the labor—demand schedule (2.6), jointly10
determine w and x in terms of w1 and x1, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1
x
It is clear now why a successful innovator would want to offer a conttact with negative
royalties. Such a connact would induce each local monopolist to produce more than
This would have two effects on V, as given by (2.17). First, it would reduce the numerator
below the maximal value given by (2.8). Second, it would also reduce the denominator by
reducing n, through (2.19). In the neighborhood of the zero—royalty solution analyzed above
the former effect would be a second—order small by the envelope theorem, but the latter would
not. Thus the seller of the th line of patents would want negative royalties so as to discourage
creative desmiction duiing interval r. The local monopolists would not attempt to discourage
creative desttuction on their own by producing more than (cw) in the absence of negative
royalties, because each one is too small to affect n.
L5
x:N.C) N11
3. PERFECTFORESIGIrI' EQUILIBRIA (PFE)
Using (2.6) and the fact thatis an invertible function, wecan writew=
Multiplyingboth sides of (2.20) by c and using the identity: c1 =weobtain:
- —1__________ (.,.l) x (xe) ￿ r/ +N— x ￿N, waloe





We define a perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE) as a sequence (xe) in (0, N]
satisfying (3.2) for all t ￿ 0. In PFE everyone can predict the future evolution of the
endogenous variables (we, x, y ire, n, V) with certainty.'4 However, the length of each
interval (in real time ic),aswell as the identity of each innovator, is random. The
characterization of PFE is simplified by the following:
Lemma 1: The mapping x i—G(x)is decreasing in x.
Lemma 1 follows from the fact that both and are decreasing functions. The
economic interpretation is as follows: A foreseen increase in x1willraise the reward .
V1to the next innovator on the one hand it raises the flow of monopoly rents
and on the other hand it reduces the amount of research and hence the amount of creative
desuuction next interval (the effect in the denominator). The increase inV1willraisethe
equilibrium wage w this period (if x<N),which in turn will induce the intermediate
monopolists to reduce their demand for labor this period, x.12
Because (3.2)isforward—looking, history does not determine a unique value of x0 in
PFE. Typically, there will be a continuum of PFE indexed by the initial value x0. However
there will only be a finite number of periodic uajectories to which any PFE could converge
asymptotically. More precisely:
Proposition 1: All PFE are. or converge asymptotically to one of the fol1owin:




Furthermore there always exists a unique SE.
We defineas a steady state= 5(i). InSE the economy experiences balanced
growth in the sense that the allocation of employment between manufacturing () and research
(fi=N—)remainsconstanL Gmwthispositiveifi<Nandzeroif=N,because there
will be innovations if and only if labor is allocated to research.
We define real 2—cycle as a pair (x0, x1) such than
(3.3) x°=(x1),x1 =5(x°),x1 s x° and N x°, x1).
Then a real 2—cycle corresponds to PFE in which manufacturing employment oscillates
between two different values with each succeeding innovation. High manufacturing
employment in odd intervals raises the reward to research during even intervals, and hence
depresses manufacturing employment during even intervals, through the mechanism discussed
above. Likewise, low manufacturing employment in even intervals raises manufacturing
employment in odd intervals.
A "no—growth' n'ap is a pair (x°, x1) such that the first three conditions of (3.3) hold,






Even though iNGT defines an infinitesequence (x}0, the oscillation of the economy will
stop afterperiod 1. Fromthenon the economywiflpezformas ifin SE with zerogrowth.
The interpieraflon of NGT is that the prospect of low manufacturing employment in even
periods so depresses the incentive to research in odd periods that research stops. As we shall
see, this can happen even in an economy that possesses a positive balanced—growth
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 rules out complicated periodic ajectories such as k—cycles with k ￿ 3, or
chaotic PFE. It follows immediately from Lemma 1, which implies that x in odd periods
follows a monotonic path in [0, N). Therefore the sequence converges. By continuity, the
limit point is a fixed point of the second—iterate map 2, which corresponds to either SE or a
2—cycle (either real or NGT). Since Y(x) is non—increasing in x, there is a unique
intersection £E[0,N]betweenthe graph of Yand the 45°—line; in other words, there is a
unique SE.'5




a.. Stat onarv Equilibrium (SE)




i.e.by the simple equation:
1—a
(3.4) a
Forgrowth to be positive, it is necessary and sufficient to have:
(3.5)
Inparticular, for a fixed value of y, ?, r, N, a necessary and sufficient condition for positive
growth is that the parameter a be sufficiently small: a <a* /( + 'er) < 1.
To interpret this result note that a is an inverse measure of monopoly power in each
intermediate sector. Specifically, 1—a is the Lerner (1934) measure of monopoly power
minus marginal cost divided by price), (1—aY is the elasticity of demand faced by an
intermediate monopolist, and 1—a is the fraction of equilibrium revenue in an intermediate
It *
sectoraccruing to the monopolist,+.Thus,if monopoly power is coo weak (a ￿ a )
ttt
then the flow of monopoly rents from the next innovation would not be enough to induce
positive research aimed at capturing those rents even if they could be retained forever, with no
creative desuction in the next interval.
b. "No—€rowth" Trap




In particular NGT will always exist when the interest xte r is saaicientiy small.16Notethat the
smaller r (or rA), the easier it is to satisfy (3.5):inother words, "no—.growth tap"equilibria
are more likely to exist in an economy that possesses a positive balanced—growth equilibrium!
c. Real 2—cycle
A sufficient condition for a real 2—cycle to exist is that: G(N) <xC (i.e. (3.6))and
2










Proposition2: When R =rAis sufficiently small and the elasticity of demand for intermediate
input (n)'8 is sufficiently close to 1. there exists a real 2-.cvcle.
The assumption that R is small guarantees that G(N) <xC. (See (b) above). Also:
3'()=(-1) I
[1 1
(See Appendix 2). This expression approaches zero as 1 approaches 1. Proposition 2 then
follows from the fact that:
2dr()= . y#(5ç))=
Inthe Cobb—Douglas case we have:
I (3.3)
Then, from Proposition 2, we know thatthereexists a real 2—cycle whenever a is small and
G(N) <xC (rA small). We can surrmiarize the conclusions obtained in the Cobb—Douglas case17
by the following picture. Again can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the degree of
monopoly power in the intermediate indusny.
Figure 5
Thereason for cycles in this model is sirnilr,butnot identical, to the reason for cycles
in the model of Shleifer (1986).'9 In the Shicifer model innovations are exogenous, and there
are multiple equilibrium sategies for implementing them, because of an aggregate—demand
externality. That externality is present in this model in an intertemporal rather than
intersectoral form. As (3.1) makes clear, higher manufacturing output next period raises the
flow of monopoly rents next period. As we have seen, it is this effect, together with the effect
of creative destruction, that makes x depend inversely upon xt+l, and which therefore makes
high manufacturing employment in odd intervals together with low manufacturing employment
in even intervals a possible equilibrium configuration.
There are several questions that would need to be addressed before judging the likely
empirical relevance of these 2—cycles. One is their observability under realistic expectational
assumptions; equilibria that are stable under perfect foresight (as in Figure 4above)are often
unstable under learning (Grandmont and Laroque, 1986). Another is the size of the resulting









labor force to research. We regard these questions as open. Learning raises many unresolved
issues, and even if the movement of labor between manufacturing and research would cause
small proportional fluctuations in the level of output it could produce large proportional
fluctuations in research, and hence in the growth rate of output. Rather than pursue these
questions further we shall focus the rest of the paper on balanced growth equiibri&
Accordingly, the main interest of the above analysis is not to propose a theory of cycles but to
describe the logic of the model of creative destruction.
4. BALANCED GROWTH
a. Time—Series Properties of Output
One of the benefits of endogenizing technical change is that we can endogenize the
average rate of growth (AGR) of the economy. Rather than have AGR depend upon
exogenous population growth and/or exogenous technical progress as in the neoclassical
growth model, we have made it depend upon various factors that affect the incentive to do
research and the fruitfulness of research in reducing production costs. In this sense we are
following the seminal contributions of Romer (1986), Lucas (1988) and others. Another
benefit is that we can endogenize the variability of the growth rate (VOR). The variance of
what appear in the model as technology shocks depends upon the same economic factors that
determine AGR In the extreme case where the incentive to do research is so small as to result
in no growth, VGR will also be zero.
We shall now proceed under the assumption that the economy is always in a situation
of positive balanced growth. Thus:20
(4.1)x = G()(more precisely G(, r, ,N))
r +(N-
Tosee how a change in the parameters r, N affects the equilibrium level of research
(ft N —O itsuffices to determine the sign of the partial derivatives o'.,o, 4Xç19
where is defined by:
X,y,G()—i
The following Lemma is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1 and the fact that
and are decreasing:
Lernma2: d=G—1<O; >O; J<O; >O;
We then obtain:
Proposition 3:Theamount of research performed in a positive balanced growth equilibrium
(a) decrease with the rate of interest r.
(b) increase with the arrival parameter .
(C) increasewith the size of each innovation (i.e. decrease with v). and
(d) increase with the total labor endowment N.
This proposition is intuitive:
(a) an increase in the interest rare r means an increase in the required rate of rennn on
research, whose effect will be to reduce the total investment in R & D.
(b) an increase in the arrival rate ).willhave both the positive effect of raising the
speed at which research pays (the effect on the numerator of 4.1), and the negativeeffect of
increasing creative desmiction (effect on the denominator). The first effect dominates.21
(c) an increase in the size of each innovation (decrease in y) also increases research by
increasing the size of next interval's monopoly rents relative to today's research costs.
(d) an increase in total labor endowment N increases research by increasing,for a given
fi, the size of the market that can be "monopolized" by a successful innovator.20
We now complete our cornparadve stacs analysis by studying the effect of the degree
of monopoly power in the intermediate indusny. In the Cobb—Douglas case, we saw that a
good (inverse) measure of monopoly power was the parameter a. In the general case we can
proceed in a similar way and define:
(4.2) F(x) =(f(x))a,
where 0 <a <1.The elasticity ragaindepends positively on a.22
We can then show:




This expression decreases with a.Thelemma then follows from (4.1). n
We then obtain the following intuitive result:
Proposition 4: An increase in monopoly power (reduction in a) increases the amount of
research in a balanced growth eguiiibrium
We now derive an explicit expression for both the average growth rate (AGR) and the
variability of the growth rate (VOR) in abalancedgrowth equilibrium. The volume of real




Thus the dme path of the log of real output âi y(r)—where r is real time—will be a random21
step—function starting at ài y0 =LiiF(H,)—Liic0, with the size of each step equal to the
constant —'(>0,and with the time between each step a sequence of jid.
variables exponentially disthbuted with parameter Xii. This statement, together with (4.1),
fully specifies the stochasnc process driving output, as a function of the parameters of the
model.
Not surprisingly, this stochastic process is nonstationary. Suppose observations were
made at discrete points in time 1 unit apart. Then from (4.4):
(4.5) Liiy(+l) =Liiy(t) +e(v);c =0,1,...
wherec(t)is -In y times the number of innovations between r and r+l. It follows from the
above discussion that {? ... } isa sequence of iid.variables dimibutedPoisson with




where e(t)c(v) + XâLii '.From(4.6)and(4.7), the discrete sequence of observations on log
output follow a random walk with constant positive drift. It also follows thac
(4.8) AGR =-XâIn y, VGR =Xii(th
Combining (4.8) with Propositions 3 and 4 we can now sign the impact of parameter
changes on AGR and VGR. Increases in the arrival parameter, the size of innovations,the size
of labor endowment and the degree of monopoly power all raise AGR. Increases in the rate of
interest lower it. These parameter changes have the same qualitative effect on VGR as on
AGR. The effects are intuitive and saightforward. The effect of monopoly power, combined
with our earlier finding (in the Cobb—Douglas case) that a minirn2l degree of monopoly power
is needed before growth is even possible, underline the importance of imperfect competition
for the growth process.22
The effects also highlight another Schuxnpererian theme: the nadeoff between current
output y =F()/cand owth. Any parameter change (other than N) that raises AGR also
reduces y (taldng c as predetermined), by drawing labor out of manufacturing. (In the case
of a that effect is amplified by the attendant shift of the production function in the
consumption—good sector.) However, the loss of current output is not, as Schumpecer argued,
a static efficiency loss of monopoly. Our assumption of inelastic labor supply prevents
imperfect competition from putting the economy inside its current frontier of manufacturing
and research. Whether the economy picks a good point on that frontier will be examined in
the next subsection.
The positive effect of N on AGR has the unfortunate implication, which Romer (1988)
has noted in a similar context, that larger economies should grow faster. In fact, (4.1') in
foomote 20 above implies that, in the Cobb—Douglas case, a doubling of population should
more than double the growth rate. (These comparisons must be intertemporal rather than
international, since we have not dealt with the question of transboundary technology flows.)
We accept the obvious implication that this class of models has little to say, without
considerable modification, about the relationship between population size and growth rate.
The variability of output in this model should be distinguished from its variability in
existing real business cycle models, for the following reasons. First, the variability of shocks
has been endogenized here. An innovation in the statistical sense in real output is the effect of
an innovation in the economic sense, the distribution of which depends as we have seen upon
economic decisions that respond to parameter changes.
Second, output never falls in this model, conttaxy to what is observed in recessions, and
contrary to what happens in existing real business cycle models. This is becauseall
innovations are increments in knowledge. A negative e(t) indicates not a decrease in
knowledge but a smaller than average increase. We accept the implication that the random
fluctuanons of output around the balanced growth path of our model tell a seriously23
incomplete story of the business cycle. Instead they are best thought of as por'aying the
stochastic end of ourpuL (Output can fall, however, in a 2—cycle.)
b. WeLfare
We now compare the laissez—faire AGR derived above with the AGR that would be
chosen by a social planner whose objective was to maximize the expected present value of
utility of consumption y(c). The maximized value of the planner's objective function, Z, when
c is historically given, is determined bythe following Bellman equation:
fF(x
(4.9) rZ =max +(N_X).(z+i— Z)
(xN)LC
Thefirst—order condition an interior solution for this problem is:
(4.10) F'(x)Ic= — Z)
Itis easily checked that the solution to (4.9) is:
* *
1 F(x )/c






Thus the social optimum is a balanced growth path, with real output growing according
to the same stochastic process as before,butwith innovations arriving at the rate
—x*)=X.ninstead of ..(N —) = Xñ. Accordinglylaissez—faire produces an AGR more
*
(less)thanoptimal ifx<(>)x
Which way these inequalities go can be checked by comparing (4.1) and (4.12). The
former can be rewritten as:
(4.13) 7=r +X(N—24
which, from the definition ofand,canbe rewritten as:
X(l—y)(— 1) +?X
(4.14) r+
where =F'()is the constant ratio between price and marginal cost in the monopolistic
intermediate industry on the balanced growth path. The right side of (4.14) is the private
reward to research, deflated by next period's real wage. The right side of (4.12) is the
corresponding social reward, deflated by the shadow cost of research next period..
There are three differences between (4.12) and (4.14): The first difference is the
presence of the term in the denominator of (4.12). This corresponds to the
intertemporal spillover effect discussed in section 2(c). A private innovator will capture rent
from his innovation for one interval only, whereas the social rent continues forever. Formally
it comes from the presence of the term Z÷1 in the definition (4.9) of the social planner's
value function Z, whereas no such term appears in the definition (2.17) of the private value of
an innovation, V. This effect leads the laissez—faire economy to underinvest inresearch:i.e.
> X.23
Thesecond difference is the presence of the term .yin the numerator of (4.14).
This corresponds to a "business—stealin' effect. The private innovator does not internalize
the loss of surplus to the monopolist whose rents he destroys. It comes formally from the
presence of —X(N —x)Zin the social planner's maximand in (4.9), whereas no corresponding
subtraction appears in the problem (2.15) solved by the private research firm. This effect leads
pnvate firms to ovennvest in research: i.e. x <x
The third difference is the presence of the term (— 1)instead of —x]in
the numerator of (4.14). This corresponds to the monopolistic distortion effect. It arises
because the flow of returns whose capitalized value the social planner attempts to maximizeis
total output, whereas the private value V is the capitalized value of profits, itt.Thisdistortiofl
can work in either direction. In the Cobb—Douglas case it is non—existent, since in that case25
F/F'—x=(!)x
=(
—l)x.(In the Cobb—Douglascase output andprofits are propornonal
to one another:=
(1-_ct)y,so the effect amounts to nothing more than a muldplicative
constant in the social—planner's decision—problem.)
The intertemporal spiilover effect will dominate when the size of innovations is large
(i.e. y is small)—in this case the private reward to research will be small compared to the big
social reward—and laissez-faire will generate an AGR less than optimaL2' On the other hand
when there is much monopoly power (a close to zero in the Cobb—Douglas case) and
innovations are not too large (i.e. y is not too small), the business—stealing effect will
dominate, leading to an AGR under laissez—faire which exceeds the optimal level of average
growth.25 (This case cannot arise in Romer's (1988) model where there is no destruction of
existing monopolistic activities).26
c. Introducing Learning by Doing
We now innoduce a second source of growth besides innovations: namely, the
accumulation of learning—by—doing (lbd) in the intermediate indusny. A natural way to
formalize lbd is to assume that in the time interval between two successive innovations, the
intermediate indusny can still improve upon the quality of its intermediate goods through
manufacturing them: more formally, if c(t) is the value of the unit cost parameter at time C in
interval t, and if x is the amount of labor devoted to manufacturing intermediate goods at that
instant, we assume:
(4.15)
where g> 0. Thus, learning-by-doing in the intermediate industry will increase productivity
in the consumption good sector at the rate g x between two innovations. When a new
innovation occurs, productivity will jump as before by the factor
Following A. Young (1928) and more recently Arrow (1962), Romer (1986), and
Dasgupta—Sdglitz (1988), we assume that the returns from learning by doing are shared by all26
firms in the economy. In particular the intermediate firms experience a complete spilloverof
their lbd, which also spills over into the research sector. Because of this externality, each
intermediate firm will choose its optimal level of intermediate output x(i) as before, relying for
lbd on the other intermediate producers; that is, taking as ven the economy—wide average x
in (4.15). In Router (1986), this type of externality leads private firms to underinvestin
htowiedge, hence to an average growth rate under laissez—faire which is lessthan the social
optimum. In this paper, however, the spillover of lbd can generate the oppositeresult; i.e. that
private economies grow too fast.27
Let denote the value to a reseaxth firm of m2ldrlg theth innovation at time t.
Define xCt), w(t) and xt) analogously. We confine attention to balanced growth equilibria,
in which x(t) = (constant). Then % =(c('r)w(t))as before, so c(r)w(t) =cw(constant).
Likewise ,tt) =(cw)/c(t).As before, V('t) is the expected present value of it evaluated
over interval t. Since icc) grows at the constant exponential razeover this interval, it
foUows that
it (jv)






r+ 2.N -(X+ g)i
The first—order condition for positive research to occur is, as before, w(r) =
Thusthe level of output in a (non—degenerate) SE is given by:
(4.18) =(r ())/x()
r+ XN -27
This equation is identical to (4.1) except for the term —g'i in the denominator. Thus the
previous analysis of stationary states wasaspecial case, with g =0.
The AGR under laissez—faire is given by:
AGR =1im ..E(iy(t) —iy0) =1im —E(t)&()
(where t is the number of innovations that occurred until date t) Given our assumption that
innovations follow a Poisson process with arrival rare )...ñ,we have:
1imE()=Xfl.
Hence:
(4.19) AGR =g(N — a)—ñ&y.
In words, the average growth rate now derives from two components: a deterministic
component due to Ibd (g(N— ñ))and a random component corresponding to the innovation
process (—Xzibry). On the other hand, VGR is given by the same formula as before since the
additional growth generated through lbd is deterministic:
(4.20) VGR =
Bycontiast with Section 4(a) above, parameters may affect AGR and VGR in opposite
directions: for example, an increase in r will reduce the amount of research a performed in
equilibrium, thereby reducing VGR. The effect on AGR is ambiguous: the random part will28
be reduced as before but the deterutinistic partwill increase together with the amount of
manufacturing labor =N—ri.In particular AGR will increase if g >-Jiry.
An increase in the speed of learning by doing (i.e. in g) willhave a positive direct
effect on AGR (equal to g(N —ii)). Itwill also indirectly affect AGR by increasing the level
of research ri.28 When the initial value of g is sufficiently small (—A.&y —g>0),the indirect
effect will increase AGR. When the initial g is large however, afurther increase in g may
have a perverse effect on growth by inducing too muchresearch at the expense of learning by
doing.
The tendency for lbd to induce too much research is brought out more clearly bythe
following welfare analysis. Let Z('r) =Z(c(t))be the social planner's value function. It
satisfies the following Bellman equation, analogous to (4.9) above:
(4.21) rZ(c(t)) =maxF(x) +.(N—x)[Z(f'c(t)) —Z(cCv))]
—
(XN}Lct
The additional term _Z'(c(r))gx c('r) is the social return from learning by doing at ume r,
according to (4.15).









where x solves the equation:
(¼.(1—y) —g'()(:
—x*)
(4.23) '1= 1 r +A.N(1—'()
The comparison between the equilibrium level under laissez—faire and the corresponding
*
levelx at the social optimum (i.e. between (4.18) and (4.23)) involves the samethree effects
as before, i.e. the intertemporal spiliover effect, the business stealing effect andthe
monopolistic distortion. But there is now an additional source of distortion due tothe
introduction of learning by doing as a second factor lbd terms in (—g) appear in the29
denominator of (4.18) andinthe numerator of (4.23):inother words introducing lbd increases
research under laissez—faire, but reduces it in the social optimum! This effect reinforces the
'business—stealing effect" mentioned earlier.
The economics of this result can be summarized as follows: learning by doing raises
the reward to research activities, by raising the net present value of rents from a successful
innovation. But it does not raise the marginal profitability of hiring manufacturing workers,
since the benefits of lbd are external to the firm (our spillover assumption). This explains why
a laissez—faire economy willrespondto an increase itt g by investing more in research at the
expense of manufacturing. With the social planner things willgothe other way around:
intern1izing the effect of Ibd in his decisions, the social planner will respond to an increase in
g by putting more workers into manufacturing, thus fewer workers into research.
To see that learning by doing can make a laissez—faire economy grow too fast, consider
the following example. Start with an economy without learning by doing, where ii =(g=0)
is almost equal to x =x(g=0).29Then:
(AGR" —AGR)=(g
+ X n y). (x*(g) —
.
Aswe have seen, _ > 0. Therefore, if x*(O) is sufficiently close to (0),
introducing learning by doing will generate too much growth at the margin:
*
AGR(dg) <AGR(dg).
5. CONSUMPTION-SMOO1NG:MAKING INNOVATIONS LARGER CAN
DEThR RESEARCH
In this section we relax the assumption of constant marginal utility. Instead, the
instantaneous utility function has a constant elasticity of marginal utility equal to s> 0. Thus30
u(c)=c1.The pure rate of time preferences is still the constant r> 0. Thus the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is l/. The preceding analysisdealt with the special
case of =0.With 0> 0, consumerS will want to smooth consumption over time, which will
affect the equilibrium.
We confine attention to situations of non—degenerate balanced growth.All households
are identicaL so all will have equal consumptionin equilibrium, equal to yiN. Thus each
innovation will reduce the marginal utility of consumption by the factor
u' (y÷i/.0/u' (y/N) ='/. Eachshareholder of a research firm will thus have a marginal rate
of substitution equal to fbetweenthe consumption good just before an innovation and the
consumption good just after. Accordingly, a research firmwill discount the payoff to a
successful innovation by the factor f,andits marginal condition for positive research will be
(5.1)w=.fVi
where V÷1 is the market value in terms of the consumption good of the t +l innovation.
That value continues to be determined by (2.17).3° From (5.1) and (2.17):
0.'(7t
(5.2) Wt=r+n
The localmonopolist'schoice problem will be the same as before. Thusina balancedgrowth
equilibrium (5.2)implies:
(53) =
Equation(5.3) determines,andhence also the level of researchfi =N—i.The only
differencebetween (5.3)and the previous equation (4.13) is the presence of 0onthe left side.
The average growth rate and itsvariability continueto be determinedby(4.8). Thusallthe
comparative statics effects on ii, AGR andVGRremain unchangedexcept for the effect ofthe
sizeof innovations.
Specifically, an increase in the size of innovations (decrease in y) stillincreases
research, and hence increases the average growth rate and its variability, ifthe elasticity of31
intet-temporal substitution exceeds unity (c <1).In this case the decrease in y decreases the
left side of (5.3),whichcauses a decrease in .Butif the elasticity of interremporal
subsutution is less than unity (c> 1), then an increase in the size of innovations leads to a
reduction in research. If the elasticity is sufficiently close to zero this could lead to such a
large reduction in research as to reduce AGR andVGR.
The economic interpretation of this new possibility is straightforward. A decrease in
raises the payoff to research as measured in units of consumption good. But it also reduces the
marginal utility of consumption after the innovation relative to before. Vihen >1the latter
effect is so strong as to reduce the utility rate of return to research. The effect is similar to the
negatively sloped savings schedule that occurs when a> 1 in the standard two—period
overlapping generations model with all endowments accruing to the young.
An increase in the intertempoi-al elasticity of substitution (decrease in a) increases the
amount of research, and hence also increases the average growth rate and its variability,
because it reduces the left side of (5.3).Intuitively,it raises the utility—rate of return to
research by reducing the rate at which marginal utility falls after an innovation.
The welfare analysis of balanced—growth equilibria is almost the same as before. The















Comparisonof (5.5)with (5.3)reveals the same three differences as before betweenand x.
So,as before,laissez—fairemay produce either too much or toolittle research.
6. ENDOGENOUS SIZE OF II4NOVAflONS: tNNOVATIONSARE TOO SMALL
UNDER LAISSEZ-FAIRE
This section generalizes the analysis of balanced growth developedin section 4 by
allowing researchfirmstochoose not onlythe frequency but also the size of innovations. We
showthatthe equilibrium size of innovationswill be independent ofeverything inthemodel
exceptthetechnologyofresearch firms. Thus allthecomparative—statics effects previously
analyzed remainunchanged. Thereis, however, a changeinthe welfare analysis.
Specifically under laissez—faire innovationswillbe too small. This new effect will reinforce
the intertemporal—sPiilOver effect in tending to make the economy growtoo slowly.
Rather than assume a linear research technologyatthe individual firm level, it is
helpful to assume an infinitely elastic supply ofidentical research firms with U—shaped cost
curves. Assume that to experience innovationswitha cost reduction factorat the ratea
firm must hire v() units of labor, with v1 > 0, v2 <0.We look for a stationary equilibrium
with a constant aggregate level of research employment a, withand equal to the constants
z and y within each research firm, and with cw =cw=constantfor a]). t. Since n/v(z,'() is the
number of firms, the aggregate arrival rate of innovations is [nlv(z,y)]Xz =(Ik)n,where k =
v(z,y)/zis a constant.
In a stationary equilibrium, the intermediate demand for manufacturinglabor, i.e.
• x =N—a,is given by:
(2.5) cw=cw=F'(x)+ x F(x),
md the value of the t+l innovation is:
61) V 1t(cw)/c+i(cw)/cw —A t+l —r+(AJk)nr+(./k)nWt÷l— W÷133
If a firm choosing j makes the (t÷l)St innovation, it will make the wage rate rise to:
(6.2) w =—— = (C'54 =
ct+lc
During interval t, the research finn takes as given that will be determined by (6.1)
and (6.2), and rakes A and w as given. Thus its decision problem is:
(6.3) max —wv()+
Assumethat (6.3)hasan interior solution. By free enny, the maximized expression in (6.3)
must equal zero. From thisandthe first—order conditions:
(6.4) v1 =vz
(6.5) v2=
From(6.3) the output of research is proportional to Thereforea research firm's
average cost is proportional to:
K(z.y) Eyv(z,y)/z.
Our assumption of U—shaped cost is:
Assumption A.3: K(z,?) is sthctly convex.
It follows from (A.3) that (6.4) and (6.5)definea unique equilibrium combination (z,y);
specifically, the combination that minimizes average cost:
(6.6) (z,?) =argmm K(z,7).
Since none of the parameters (r,X,N) enter (6.6), it follows that y and z are independent
of them. Similarly, the size of each innovation is independent of the deee of monopoly
power. Thus all comparative—statics results go through as before except for those describing34
theeffects of varying the size of innovations, which are no longerrelevant since the size is
endogenouS.
To conduct the welfare analysis, note that the social planner'smaximized objective
function Z(c) is given by the Bellman equation:
(6.7) r Z(c) = F(N —mv(z.')) ÷ Xmz(Z('jt) —Z(c))}
z,'(,m} t
where m is the number of finns.31
The first—order conditions for this problem are:
—F'v c' + Xz(Z(fIv)_Z(ct)) =0
—F'c'my1 + u1(Z('tv)_Z(c))
=0
—F' c1 my2 + XzmcZ'(v) =0




** * * *** 'I
wherek=v(z ,y )/z ,n =m v(z ,y )an±
(6.8) v1 =vz
(6.9) v2 =(1—7)'v
Our main result is that innovations are too small in equiiibxium
Proposition5:
Proof: Define a y' v(z*,y*)/z*(1.y ) > 0. From A.3, (6.8) and (6.9):
**
(6.10) (z ,y ) =argmin(K(z,y) + ry).35




+ a>K(z '7 ) --
* *
Fromthese inequalities: a?> a .Sincea> 0, therefore '>y. a
This result is another manifestation of the business—stealing effect. The smaller the
innovation the larger the losses through obsolescence relative to the gains of an innovation.
The private rm ignores this cost of raising y
By free enny the rnaximand in (6.3) equals zero. This implies:
(611) =(l())/4()
where k= v(z,y)/z.The solution to (6.7) yields:
r *I'( \ (1_i \IL/* *" ii I
(6.12) = LF'(x)
kr/2+(1-y )N
Comparison of (6.11) with (6.12) reveal the same three distortions as before on the equilibrium
*
amountof research. In addition, the fact that y> y will tend to create too little research. The
a
factthat kicwill also generate a distortion. As before, the total level of research may be
too much or too little.
7. RANDOMARRIVAL PARAMETER CREATIVE DESTRUCTION CAN DESTROY
GROWTH
In this section we allow the arrival parameter ?.tovary randomly. This generalization
illustrates the force of creative destruction by allowing an increase in in some states of the
world to deter research in other states. In fact, we present an example where in the limit as the
value of in one state becomes infinite, the average growth rare falls to zero.
Let be the finite set of possible values of 2.. At the moment of any
innovation a new .isdrawn, according to the ansition ixianix A, and all research firms learn36
this value. Transinon into a high—. state could represent a fundamentalbreakthrough that
leads to a Schumpeteflan wave of innovations, whereas nansinon to a low statecould represent
the exhaustion of a line of research.
The stochastic equivalent of balanced growth equilibrium is an equilibrium inwhich
manufacturing employment depends only on the stare of the world, not ontime. Let V/ce be
the value of malting theth innovation and moving into state j. In any state i, the marginal
expected return to research in interval t is X Z1 a1 Vj/cj.This will equal the wage if










(7.2) f=Z .n.q. 1 1 1
where q1 is the asymptotic fraction of rime spent in state i.





To complete the example, take the Cobb—Douglas case (F(x) =x)and suppose= = 1/2,






When=1,the solution to (7.5)isV1 =V2= whichimplies n1 =a2=1/3,and
f =113.When =, thesolution is V1 =1/4,V2 =3/4,which implies a1 =0,=I,and
2n1n2 = +=0. Thus raising the productivity of research in one state can cause research
nhI,_2n2
to be discouraged in the other state, through the threat of creative desuction, to such an extent
that growth is eliminated.
8. CONCLUSION
We have presented a model of economic growth based on Schumpeters process of
creative desucuon. Growth resultsexclusivelyfrom technological progress, which in turn
results from competition among research firms that generate innovations. Each innovation
consists of a new line of intermediate goods that can be used to produce final output more
efficiently than before. Research firms are motivated by the prospect of monopoly rents
that can be captured when a successful innovation is patented. But those rents in turn will be
desnoyed by the next innovation, which will render obsolete the existing line of intermediate
goods.38
The model possesses a unique balanced—growth equilibrium, in which thereis a
constant allocanon of laborbetweenresearch and manufacturing. In that equilibrium the log
of GNP follows a random walk with drift. The size of the drift is the economy's average
growth rate, and the variance of the increments is the variabilityof the growth rate. Both
these parameters of growth are endogenous to the model, and depend uponthe rate of time
preference and elasticity of intertemporalsubstitution of the representative household, and
upon the size and likelihood ofinnovations resulting from research.
As Schumpeter argued, the degree of market power available to someone implementing
an innovation will also be an importantdeterminant of growth. We have parametrize"&
market power, and shown that it has a positive effect upon both the average growthrate and its
variability.
The average growth rate and its variability are also affected by the extent of
learning—by--doing in the manufacturing sector of the economy. The greaterthe coefficient of
learning—by-doing, the more research will be undertaken. This will raisethe average rate of
growth attributable to research, but it may decrease the growthattributable to learning—by—
doing, because the only way for society to engage in more research is totake labor out of
manufacturing.
The average growth rate may be more or less than socially optimal, because there are
two counteracting distortions. The first is a technology spillover. A successfulinnovation
produces iowledge that other researchers can use without compensation tothe innovator.
The counteracting distortion is a "business—stealing" effect. The private researchfirm does not
internalize the loss to others due to obsolescence resulting from his innovations.We also show
that innovations aie too small under laissez—faire, again because of the business—Stealing
effect.
Learning by doing introduces a further distortion because it is external tothe individual
manufacturing firm. This distortion tends to produce too little manufacturing,and hence too
much research. Whether it produces too much or too little growth depends upon therelative39
efficacy of learning by doing and research as sources of growth.
Under some circumstances the model possesses equilibria in addition to the unique one
with balanced growth. One is a 'no—growth uap" in which the economy stops growing in
finite time because of the (rational) expectation that if one more innovation were to take place
it would be followed by a flurry of research activity. This expectation makes it so likely that
the rents accruing to the producer of the next innovation will be desuoyed quickly that it is not
worth uying to create the innovation, and research stops.
Two final results are worth mentioning here. First, if the representative household in
the model has a sufficiently low intertemporal elasticity of substitution then an increase in the
size of innovations can actually reduce the amount of research, and hence reduce the average
rate of growth in the economy. Second. when the Poisson arrival rate of innovations
is a random function of the amount of research, an increase in the likelihood of innovations in
one state of the world will result in extra creative destruction in that state; this can discourage
research in other states to such an extent that the economy's average growth rare falls.
Weconclude by noting directions for future research. It would be useful to allow the
size of innovation eventually to fall, to allow for the possibility that technology is niumately
bounded. Also to include a richer intersectoral structure to study both the positive dynamics of
diffusion and the normative effects of intersectoral spillover. The model would also gain
richness and realism if capital were introduced, either physical or human capital embodying
technical change, or Rand D capital that affects the an-ivai rare of innovations.32 Allowing
unemployment by introducing search externalities into the labor market, and changing the
structure of demand for intermediate goods so as to allow for a contemporaneous aggregate
demand externality, might also generate multiple equilibria and allow us to study the
reciprocal interaction between technical change and the business cycle. All these extensions
seem feasible because of the simplicity and transparency of the basic model.40
APPENDIX1
AssumptionA. I is satisfiedin theCEScase.
LetF(x) =(x+ where 0 <p < I.
We have:
F' =1/p(x+ H"px1 . (x+ H)11
Hence: F =(p
—1)x2(x+ H)' + (1/p —1)(x+ HP*'2px
=(p
—1)(x1+ H)1 2(xX +xPiP —
= (p — 1)(x+H)'1P2xH'<o
anct .L.
F"=(p — 1)(1/p—2)(x+ HP)1 3px1x2
+(p—1)(x+H) 1/P2(p_2)xP3
=(p
—1)(x+ H)1"((1 —2p)x2'3 +(p —2)x2+ Hx3(p —2)]
=(p—1)x3(x +H)113[(p —2)H—(1+ p)x].
Therefore:
2F+xF" =(x+ H)1H(p —1)(2x2(x +H)
+ x2t(p —2)H—(1+








Using(2.5),(2.8),and the factthati =(wc),we get:
'[wc1('(wc)Iy ÷ ((x))/y
rA+N—(wc) '(wc)r +N-x]
1/)' ('(wc) +?WC '(wc))
rA +N-(wc)









By the first—order condition (23):
F'(x)(l =wc.
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FOOTNOTES
'In the Deneckere—Iudd model a constant proportion of existing intermediate goods
disappear each period. The equilibrium of the model exhibits no growth.
2More recent work by Cochrane (1988) shows that this evidence is not, however,
conclusive.
3Thus policy analysis based on the K.ing—Rebelo model would be subject to the Lucas
critique because it neats the variability of growth as invariant to the policy determinants of
growth.
4Mention should also be made of the preliminary work of Corriveau (1988), who is
developing a similar model of growth and cycles in a discrete time setting. The discrreness
of time In Comveaus model inaoduces complications from the possibility of simultaneous
innovations, which we avoid by our assumption of continuous time. In Con-iveaus framework
all innovations are non—drastic, and it is not possible to parameterize the degree of monopoly
power in the economy as we have done.
5Some consequences of inn-oducing memory are discussed in section 8 below.
6Scherer (1984) combines process— and input—oriented R and D into a measure of
'used" R and D, which he distinguishes from pure product R and D. He estimates that during
the period 1973—1978 in U.S. industry the social rate of return to "used" R and D lay between
71% and 104%, whereas the return to pure product R and D was insignificant.
7Graual diffusion could be introduced by allowing the c.: st parameter after each
innovation to follow a predetermined but gradual path asympotically approaching the limit c,
and then to jump to c upon the next innovation and follow a gradual path approaching c1.
This would produce a cycle in research within each interval, as the gradual fall in costs
induces manufacturing firms to hire more and more workers out of research until the next
innovation occurs.
8Note that this description of technology implies increasing returns in the production of
the consumption good, the ultimate inputs of which are land, labor (as embodied in the
intermediate goods) and knowledge (as embodied in the cs). If land and labor alone were
doubled, then the flow of intermediate input would also double, and hence, by the assumption
of constant returns, final output would just double. Since there are constant returns in these
two factors holding the third constant, there are increasing returns in all three.
The technological specification of the economy follows that of Griliches (1979). There
exist empirical studies casting doubt on our assumptions that there are constant returns in
research in that a doubling of research will double the rate of innovations (Griliches, 1989),
that there is no variability in the size of innovations (Pakes, 1986), and that there is no
variability in the Poisson arrival rate of innovations (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984).
The first two assumptions can be relaxed with only notational difficulties. The third is relaxed
in section 7 below.
9The alternative assumption that research firms have identical U—shaped functions with
a small efficient scale produces identical results. This alternative is employed in section 6
below.
lOBellman equations like (2.14) axe standard in the patent—race literature (see Tirole,
1988, cli. 10). Several more are innoduced below. This footnote presents an alternative
derivation. Let T, T, and T" be, respectively, the time of the next innovation, the tune at
which the other firms would experience their first innovation if they held employment constant
atforever, and the time at which this firm would experience its first innovation if it held its46
employment constant at z forever. Under the no—spillover assumption.T' and T" are
independent random variables, expoentially distributed with respective parameters 2LiTand Xz,
and T =mm(T', T"). It follows that, as already mentioned, T is exponentially disthbuted
with parameter + z) and that the probability that the next innovation will be made by this
firm, conditional on the date of that innovation, Prob {T =T'T) is the constant + z).
Thus, conditional on T, the value of the research firm is:
=
eT[Wt+i
+ Prob (T=T' T1V+L] —ewztit
Thus:
= eT[w+1+ + zDV÷1]1 (j-rT)wz
By definition:
W =MaxEW(T). (z￿O)
Since E(eT) = +z)/(r + X(i + z)):
+ z)W+i + .zV1 —wz W=Max(z ￿O) r+.(n+z)
The last equation is equivalent to (2.14).
"It is straightforward to relax the assumption of complete spiflover by allowing theth
innovator to have an advantage in finding the t+1 innovation; to have an arnval parameter .'>..Wehave worked out this analysis under the assumption of U—shaped cost with small
efficient scale (see footnote 9),withno important change in results.
120ur analysis of research is derived from the patent—race literature surveyed by
Reinganum (1987) and mole (1988, ch. 10). Within that literature the paper closest to oursis
Reinganum (1985), which emphasizes the affinity to creative destruction. Most other papers
do not have the sequence of races necessary for creative destruction. Our paper goes beyond
that literature by embedding the sequence of races in a general-equilibrium setting. Thus
(a) the flow of profits ir resulting from an innovation will depend upon the amount of
research during the next interval, (b) our welfare criterion is the expected lifetime utility of the
representative consumer, (c) we characterize the time—series properties of GNP, and (d)in
section 5 we find that the size of innovations affects the rate of discount applied to research.
In addition, the analysis in section 6 of the endogenous determination of the size of
innovations, and the analysis of cycles in section 3, go beyond anything we have foundin the
patent—race literature.
3G is well defined on (0,N), by Al.
14The methods of Azariadis (1981) or Woodford (1986) could also be used to construCt47
rational—expectations sunspot equilibria, at least in some cases.
5This distinguishes our model from the ,owth model with externalities developed in
Romer (1986), which may have no steady state.






By continuity, (3.6) will hold for r (or rA) positive but small.
17A real 2—cycle also exists if G(N) >xCand Y() >1.However, this can never
occur in the Cobb—Douglas case (see Aghion and Howitt, 1988).
1S,1(X)E—
l9Likewise,the reason for cycles is similar to that underlying the chaotic fluctuations in
the model of Deneckere and Judd (1986). They model innovations as Romer (1988) does, with
no creative desuuict±on.. Their dynamics are backward looking, because the incentive to
innovate depends upon the existing number of products, which depends upon past innovative
activity, whereas their assumption that monopoly rents are not desnoyed by future innovations
makes the incentive independent of future innovative activity. Their cycles arise because the
only rest—point of their backward—looking dynamics is unstable.




211n the extension of the model considered in section 7 the second effect may dominate.
2r1(x,a)E—F'(x)/xF"(x)= f(x) f'(x)
(1—a)xff'(x)]2 —xf(x)r(x)
23Two additional kinds of spillover can easily be included. First, researchers could
benefit from the flow of others' research, so that an individual firm's arcival rate would be a
constant returns function (z,n) of its own and others' research. Second, there could be an
exogenous Poisson arrival rate ji.ofimitations that costlessly circumvent the patent laws and
clone the existing line of intermediate goods. Both would have the effect of lowering AGR.
Also as we showed in Aghion and Howitt (1988), the inclusion of p. would innoduce another
source of cycles in the economy, since each imitation would make the intermediate rndusiry
perfectly competitive, which would raise manufacturing employment, until the next innovation
arrives.
24More formally, as y fails to the lower limitr XN x* approaches zero, whereas j
approaches a snictly positive limit.48
251n the Cobb—Douglas case, if rAN, then ñ >0,for all(see 3.5)whereasn =
0when ?..N/ar.
26There seems to be a presumption among empirical students of R and D that spillovers
will dominate business stealing in a welfare comparison. See, for example, Griliches (1979, p.
99).
271he formal source of these different results is that in our model research is a separate
activity from the production of the goods embodying hiowledge. The activity whose doing
creates external learning is the production. Doing it more intensively requires less research to
be undertaken. Romer follows Arrow (1962) in assuming that the two activities are
inseparably bundled, thereby eliminaung this tradeoff.
28This follows immediately from equation (4.18), using the fact that both and Z are
decreasing function.
291n the Cobb—Douglas case: (1)_÷
30Someone who gave up a marnal unit of consumption to buy shares in a local patent
would receive a constant dividend of ir/V until T, the date of the next innovation. The
expected utility gain of the transaction would be:
T ________ ErIou'(ct)(r/V)dr =r+
Equatingthis to the expected utility cost u'(c) yields (2.17).
31We assume that no non—negativity consnaints bind.
3ZWe have examined the consequences of a limited nd of R and D capital by
allowing for the arrival parameter to increase randomly in the middle of an interval, and then
to remain high until the next innovation, so that the probability of an innovation depends not
just upon the flow of research but also upon the length of rime over which the innovation has
been sought. The analysis is formally like that of section 7 above, and most of the
comparative—statics results of section 4 go through.